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Letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 25 June 2001, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Umit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43636 (E) 090701

Annex to the letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to refer to the letter dated 29 May 2001 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations (A/55/970-S/2001/541) concerning the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by the Security Council.

It is clear from the tone of this letter that the Greek Cypriot side is not interested in a new partnership with the Turkish Cypriot side on the basis of political equality as a former partner in the 1960 Republic of Cyprus which was destroyed by the Greek Cypriot side in 1963. The purpose of the Greek Cypriot onslaught in 1963 was to convert the island into a Greek Cypriot republic and render the Turkish Cypriot co-founder partner a minority. The Greek Cypriot side has not succeeded in achieving this aim as the Turkish Cypriots valiantly defended their rights for 11 years from 1963 to 1974 and defied the illegal Greek Cypriot regime which tried to impose its will on them as the so-called "Government of Cyprus", after declaring the Constitution to be dead and buried. The Greek Cypriot side is still of the opinion that they can dictate their terms and their authority on the Turkish Cypriot people. One should never lose sight of the fact that the Greek Cypriot side, in pursuit of an unlawful aim, namely the union of the island with Greece, tried deliberately to destroy a guaranteed system of partnership resting on the political equality and effective participation of the two sides in the Government and on the mutually agreed principle that one community would not impose its will on the other. The *state of affairs* created by the 1960 Agreements was based on the internal balance between the two co-founder peoples in Cyprus and the external balance between Turkey and Greece over the island.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was set up by the Turkish Cypriot people, 20 years after having been forced out of the state by force of arms. After the failure of all attempts to settle the Cyprus issue by establishing a new partnership on the basis of equality, the Turkish Cypriot people had no alternative but to declare their own independent state in order to prove to the Greek Cypriots, and those who supported them as the so-called legitimate "Government of Cyprus", that Turkish Cypriots have not and will not accept this *fait accompli* created by Greek Cypriot aggression.

The reference made by the Greek Cypriot representative in his letter to the TRNC as a "subordinate local administration in the occupied areas of Cyprus" is an insult to each one of us, an insult which we cannot ignore. The allegation that we are trying to exploit the issue of the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP in order to gain some form of recognition or acknowledgement for what they call a "secessionist entity" is a further insult and an affront to our efforts to re-establish a new partnership on the basis of absolute equality between the two existing States in Cyprus.

The allegation by the Greek Cypriot representative that Turkey is pursuing a long-standing objective of legalizing its aggression against the "Republic of Cyprus" is a further insult to injury, knowing full well that it is the Greek Cypriot side which has taken up arms in order to destroy an internationally established partnership Republic for purposes which the 1960 Agreements prohibited. There was no

secession on the part of the Turkish Cypriot side but there was a bloody coup d'état by the Greek Cypriot side to take over a partnership state by ejecting the Turkish Cypriots from the state. As a consequence, the Turkish Cypriots exercised their right to establish their own legal administration in order to survive as a nation.

The Government of Turkey has been pursuing its efforts to help the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to establish with the Greek Cypriot side a new partnership on the basis of a new agreement. Turkey's recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a valid proof of the intention of Turkey to continue to protect the Turkish Cypriot people as co-founder partner of the former 1960 Republic and as co-founder partner of any agreement that will be made in the future. Without this guarantee it is clear that there can be no new partnership with the former Greek Cypriot partner.

It is an irrefutable fact that UNFICYP cannot function in Cyprus without the consent of the parties involved in the conflict and Security Council resolutions clearly indicate that the parties in the conflict and the parties which will settle this conflict, without any interference from outside, are the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot parties. The attempt to enforce UNFICYP's presence in the North under the pretext that the so-called Government of Cyprus (i.e. the Greek Cypriot party) has consented to its creation is unacceptable and will be resisted.

Furthermore, the fact that the composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a clear indication that without the consent of the parties involved there can be no renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus in resolution 186 (1964) clearly refers to the bi-communal partnership government as envisaged by the 1960 Agreements.

The bi-communal partnership set-up has been destroyed by force of arms by the Greek Cypriot side. Currently, there exists an authority in the North which has all the attributes of a proper, democratically constituted State. Therefore it is necessary that until the dispute is settled between the two parties, the consent of both parties should be taken while extending the mandate of the Force.

In this context, it should be emphasized that the local military arrangements along the ceasefire line have been established with full participation of Turkish Cypriot authorities in those efforts. The Greek Cypriot representative has tried to conceal this fact. Even the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi report) is purposely misrepresented. The Brahimi report explicitly states that peace operations have to be with the consent of the parties involved. This principle is underlined in paragraph 48 of the Brahimi report (A/55/305-S/2000/809): "The panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping".

The allegation by the Greek Cypriot side that the Cyprus issue is a question of foreign invasion and occupation of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, by the Republic of Turkey, is not borne out by historical facts. I would like to emphasize that Turkey intervened in Cyprus, in accordance with her rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, following the Greek-Greek Cypriot coup d'état in July 1974, the aim of which was the annexation of the island by Greece. Turkish

intervention p· vented not only the colonization of the island by Greece but also the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriot people at the hands of the Greek Cypriots and the invading Greek troops.

It is alleged that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus depends entirely on the "occupying power" which finances its budget. The Greek Cypriot side, which ahs thrown out the Turkish Cypriots from the budget of Cyprus, now for 38 years, is not the authority to complain about who finances the budget of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Had it not been for the assistance and protection provided by Turkey, there would have been no Turkish Cypriot today in Cyprus.

The attempt to deal with the Cyprus issue on the basis of percentages of population is totally wrong and misleading because the relationship of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot partners in the body politic of Cyprus was not that of a majority and minority but that of two politically equal national communities, one looking at Turkey and the other at Greece as motherlands, which became the guarantors of the *state of affairs* created by the international Cyprus agreements. The *state of affairs* rested on the principle that neither of the parties had the right to rule the other, nor could either of them assume the right to be the government of both or the island as a whole.

Lastly, I would like to emphasize that the attempt by the Greek Cypriot side to misuse Security Council resolutions which wrongly treat the Greek Cypriot side as the Government of Cyprus at the expense of the rule of law and international agreements is a clear indication that they are not for settling the issue on the basis of a new partnership. The Turkish Cypriot side will work towards a settlement on the basis of two States which would respect the sovereign and equal rights of both peoples and their security interests. We hope that the international community will urge the Greek Cypriot side to adopt a realistic approach that would facilitate such a settlement in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 26 June 2001, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ümit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43762 (E) 090701

Annex to the letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the statement made by Dr. Christodoulos Christodoulou, Interior Minister of the Greek Cypriot administration, at the special session of the General Assembly for an overall review and appraisal of the implementation of the Habitat Agenda, held in New York from 6 to 8 June 2001, and to bring to your kind attention the following.

At the outset, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Greek Cypriot official has devoted his entire statement to making false accusations against Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is hardly compatible with the theme and spirit of the said session. He has unabashedly abused the General Assembly special session for propaganda purposes rather than focusing on issues relating to the Habitat Agenda. Since the Turkish Cypriot side is denied the right of reply at the General Assembly, I am compelled to respond to his allegations in writing.

Dr. Christodoulou has claimed that "Cyprus achieved significant socio-economic growth between independence, in 1960, and 1974". This statement is an attempt to cover up the fact that the Cyprus question began, not in 1974, but in 1963, as a result of the destruction, by force of arms, of the partnership Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot side. This is why a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) has been in the island since 1964. It is ridiculous to claim that there was "socio-economic growth" at a time when 30,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees fleeing Greek Cypriot aggression were forced to live in enclaves, all Turkish Cypriots were being persecuted, attacked and harassed on a daily basis and the Turkish Cypriot areas were subjected to inhuman embargoes by the Greek Cypriot administration. The following extracts from the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council aptly describe the dark period between 1963 and 1974:

> "190. In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year, the Turkish [Cypriot] community had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government and by public and private concerns located in the Greek Cypriot Zones. The trade of the Turkish [Cypriot] community had declined considerably during the period, owing to the existing situation, and unemployment had reached a very high level, as approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had become refugees. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber on development and other projects, as well as other expenditure, had dropped considerably as a yearly subsidy formerly received from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964. ... In accordance with the figures published by the Turkish [Cypriot] Communal Chamber, the number of persons receiving some kind of assistance from the Red Crescent relief amounted to about 56,000, including 25,000 displaced persons, 23,500 unemployed and 7,500 dependents of missing persons, disabled persons and others.
>
> "...
>
> "221. ... Thus in recent weeks, UNFICYP has been devoting major efforts towards eliminating or lessening the hardship experienced by many Turkish

communities in Cyprus because of the economic restrictions which have been imposed by the Government [Greek Cypriot administration] of Cyprus.

"222. ... the economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, ... in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege ..." (S/5950 of 10 September 1964)

The Greek Cypriot Minister has referred to "Turkish invasion" and "occupied areas". I would like to emphasize that the only "occupation" in Cyprus is the 37-year-long occupation of the seat of government of the "Republic of Cyprus" by the Greek Cypriot side. Following the Greek coup d'état in Cyprus in July 1974, Turkey had no choice but to intervene in accordance with its rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in order to prevent the annexation of the island by Greece to save the Turkish Cypriot people from total annihilation at the hands of the Greek Cypriots and the invading Greek troops. It will be recalled that the then Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, in his address to the Security Council on 19 July 1974, confirmed that it was in fact Greece, not Turkey, that had invaded the island in 1974.

Dr. Christodoulou also alleged that the question of refugees came about in 1974. The question of refugees, as also documented by the Secretary-General's reports during that period, first began in 1958 when the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization EOKA's gunmen, in their violent campaign to annex the island to Greece, drove 6,000 Turkish Cypriots from their homes in 33 villages; and then in 1963 when the Turkish Cypriot people were subjected to violence and displaced as a result of the Greek Cypriot onslaught. The Turkish Cypriot people who were then forced to evacuate 103 villages had to take refuge in relatively secure enclaves and live under inhuman conditions for 11 years until the Turkish intervention in 1974.

Dr. Christodoulou has referred to "substantial growth achieved since 1974". This pertains to South Cyprus controlled by the Greek Cypriot administration, which purports to be the "Government of Cyprus". Under this usurped title, the Greek Cypriot administration is receiving all international assistance, while preventing the extension of any technical or financial assistance to Northern Cyprus from international sources. Dr. Christodoulou has failed to mention the embargoes his administration has been imposing on the Turkish Cypriot people since 1963, which extends to all spheres of life including trade and tourism, travel and communication as well as sports and cultural activities. These inhuman embargoes not only curtail the economic and social development of the Turkish Cypriot people but also infringe upon their human and civil rights.

While referring to the economic situation, the Greek Cypriot Minister also has had the audacity to claim that the Greek Cypriot administration "is taking into consideration the needs of the whole of Cyprus", while his regime has been imposing the aforementioned embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot people. This is not at all surprising in view of the fact that for the Greek Cypriot side "the needs of the whole of Cyprus" means the needs of only the Greek Cypriots.

Dr. Christodoulou has alluded to the so-called "enforced division" of the island and "severance of the centuries-old settlement system" in an attempt to falsely accuse the Turkish Cypriot side. In this regard, I would like to remind the Greek Cypriot Minister that the division of the island was caused by the Greek Cypriot

attacks on the Turkish Cypriot people, as was also evident in the successive reports of the Secretary-General on Cyprus for the 1964-1974 period.

As for the allegations of "deformation of demographic characteristics of the population of Cyprus", I should like to emphasize that in line with its attempts to change the demographic structure of the island through ethnic cleansing, the Greek Cypriot administration introduced thousands of soldiers and settlers from Greece. I should also like to remind the Greek Cypriot Minister that at the centre of the Greek Cypriot administration's policy was the Akritas Plan, a plan prepared by the Greek Cypriot leadership at the time, to ethnically cleanse Cyprus of its Turkish Cypriot population and to turn Cyprus into a Greek island. In line with this notorious plan, the Greek Cypriot armed elements massacred hundreds of innocent Turkish Cypriots, including three-day-old babies, women and elderly people in an effort to exterminate the Turkish Cypriots or to force them out of Cyprus. Mass graves at Atlilar, Muratağa and Sandallar stand as evidence of the unspeakable crimes committed by the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot people.

Even today the inhuman treatment of the few hundred Turkish Cypriots remaining in Southern Cyprus continues. The European Court of Human Rights, on 23 May 2001, found the Greek Cypriot administration guilty of ill-treatment of nine Turkish Cypriots while in detention in Southern Cyprus and ordered the illegal regime to pay compensation to each of the applicants. Furthermore, in April 2001, Dr. Christodoulou himself, in his capacity as the Interior Minister, faced accusations for the mistreatment of around 100 Turkish Cypriot gypsies by the Greek Cypriot authorities in Southern Cyprus. An editorial entitled "Reaction to Gypsies raises uncomfortable questions", published in the *Cyprus Mail* (South Cyprus) dated 10 April 2001, addressed this issue and its implications for the search for a settlement in Cyprus:

> "Is the government's plan to set up a kind of leper colony, miles away from any other community, in which to throw all undesirable visitors such as gypsies and illegal immigrants? This smacks of official racial discrimination and, regrettably, is consistent with the government's policy for dealing with Turkish Cypriots who have arrived from the occupied north. Most have been moved into run-down housing in what used to be known as the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol and can now be described as a Turkish ghetto ...
>
> "The implications of this behaviour should be seriously considered by the political leadership, which has been fighting for the re-unification of the island under a federal government for close to three decades. It may just be that Greek Cypriots do not want the re-unification of the island if this means living next door to a Turkish Cypriot. Would the Greek Cypriot public really be as happy as it claims with a solution that guaranteed the three fundamental freedoms — of movement, settlement and property? Would Paphians be happy if the Turkish Cypriots swarmed to their town or would they be holding protest demonstrations to stop them? What would the residents of Kotsiatis say if Turkish Cypriots decided to return to their homes in the village? ...
>
> "... the xenophobic reaction to the arrival of a few dozen gypsies would seem to suggest that there is a gulf between what the politicians see as the ideal form of a Cyprus settlement and what Greek Cypriots actually want."

Accusations regarding "the systematic change of official toponyms", in Northern Cyprus demonstrate that the Greek Cypriot administration cannot even accept the fact that the Turkish Cypriot people have as much right as the Greek Cypriots to refer to toponyms of their homeland in their own language. The island have always enjoyed dual place names due to the existence of two peoples of different ethnic backgrounds and languages in the island.

As for the allegations regarding historical and cultural heritage, it is important to stress that the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus work diligently to protect and preserve the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus regardless of its origin. The Greek Cypriot administration, while accusing the Turkish Cypriot side of attempting to eradicate the heritage of the island, systematically blocks the flow of any external financial or technical assistance to Northern Cyprus for conservation purposes. The Greek Cypriot administration has, since 1963, been trying to eradicate all traces of the Turkish-Muslim heritage of Cyprus. During the period 1963-1974, mosques, shrines and other holy sites in 103 villages were destroyed. Today, the remaining Ottoman Turkish shrines including the historic Bayraktar Mosque and the Ömeriye Mosque located in Southern Cyprus, have been targets of repeated arson attacks and are disintegrating due to total neglect.

Mr. Van der Werff, General Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on the Architectural and Artistic Heritage of the Committee on Culture and Education of the Council of Europe, who visited the island with a delegation of experts to study the situation regarding cultural property both in the North and the South, reported in paragraph 5.3 of his report, which was published as a document of the Council of Europe on 2 July 1989 (AS/CULT/AA(41)1) that "We saw no churches destroyed though St. George in Limnia (in the North) was listed as such."

The report further states that "We noted with regret the complete destruction of the main mosque in Paphos (in the South). The whole area has since been flattened to give way for a widened road junction and a car park. There is no memorial to the existence of the mosque. Below the road a Turkish bath complex remains hidden in rubble and vegetation awaiting restoration. The Turkish cemetery nearby St. Sophia Mouttalos mosque is dilapidated."

More recently, Ms. Vlasta Stepova, a Council of Europe Rapporteur on Cultural Heritage, who visited both sides of the island in November 2000, also confirmed that there is no "vandalism of cultural monuments" in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

On the European Union membership issue, I would like to reiterate that the membership of the Greek Cypriot administration, purporting to act for and on behalf of the whole of Cyprus, on the basis of its unilateral application, is contrary to the 1960 Cyprus Treaties and international law. The Greek Cypriot side's aspiration to become a member of the EU is based on its ultimate objective to use its membership as a pretext to challenge the previously agreed and established parameters within the United Nations process. It is important to note that membership of the Greek Cypriot administration, under the usurped title of "government of Cyprus", would not only destroy all prospects for reconciliation between the two parties, bringing about ultimately the permanent division of the island, but would also pose a threat to peace and stability in the island and in the region.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2001/646

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 June 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 27 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the press release concerning the meeting which took place in Brazzaville, on 17 June 2001, between Denis Sassou-Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, and Major General Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council, and also have them circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Atoki **Leka**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43417 (E) 020701 020701

Annex to the letter dated 27 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Press release

At the invitation of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, Major General Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paid a working visit to Brazzaville on 27 June 2001.

During this visit, Major General Joseph Kabila had private talks with his counterpart and brother from the Republic of the Congo.

The two heads of State took the opportunity to review bilateral and also multilateral issues.

At the international level, discussions between the two heads of State focused, inter alia, on the forthcoming summit of the Organization of African Unity, which is scheduled for 9 to 11 July in Lusaka, Zambia, and on the human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic which was the subject of much debate at the special session of the United Nations in New York.

At the bilateral level, the two heads of State welcomed the outcome of the tenth session of the Higher Joint Cooperation Commission held at Brazzaville from 22 to 27 November 2000.

They also welcomed the joint efforts made by the two sister countries to ensure safety of navigation on the Congo and Ubangui rivers, in accordance with the non-aggression pact signed by the two Governments on 29 December 1999 and the conclusions of the Summit Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Africa, held in Kinshasa on 27 October 2000.

The two heads of State instructed their ministers in charge of security questions to continue the work of the Tripartite Commission.

Major General Joseph Kabila informed his counterpart of developments in the political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the organization of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

In return, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso informed his host of the outcome of the all-inclusive national dialogue held in Brazzaville from 17 March to 14 April 2001.

The two heads of State expressed delight at the climate of fraternity and mutual understanding which reigned throughout their talks.

At the close of his visit, Major General Joseph Kabila thanked his counterpart and brother from the Republic of the Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, for his fraternal invitation and for the quality of the welcome extended to himself and his delegation.

On his side, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso accepted with pleasure the invitation extended to him by Major General Joseph Kabila to visit Kinshasa in the near future.

27 June 2001

United Nations S/2001/647

Security Council

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29 June 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 27 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of an incident that took place at 4 a.m. on 19 June 2001. The tender *1 Haziran* was returning to Mina' al-Nasr (formerly Abu Fulus) after unloading its cargo at Mina' al-Zubayr when it became the object of a United States act of aggression inside Iraqi territorial waters at a point 1 nautical mile from Mina' al-Amiq. United States forces attacked the vessel using two armed craft and a helicopter. It was taken to a point 10 nautical miles south of Mina' al-Bakr, where the crewmen were held on deck while the entire vessel was searched. The tender and its crew were released after three and a half hours.

In entering Iraqi territorial waters in order to attack the tender and its crew United States forces committed a wanton breach of Iraq's sovereignty and an act of armed aggression that by the most elementary norms governing international relations is in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and prevailing international custom, all of which forbid the threat or use of force against the sovereignty and independence of any State. We protest against the hostile actions being taken by United States forces, and we urge you to intervene in order to prevent encroachments such as these, involving as they do entry into Iraqi territorial waters in order to commit such acts of provocation. The Government of Iraq reserves in full the inalienable right accorded to it by the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and international custom to take the measures necessary to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and, in accordance with the principle of international responsibility, to claim compensation for the moral and material damage done to it by these acts of aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43423 (E) 020701 020701

United Nations S/2001/648

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 June 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward the attached press release entitled "Ethiopia resumes deportation" issued today, 28 June 2001, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ahmed Tahir **Baduri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43429 (E) 020701

Annex to the letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Press Release

Ethiopia resumes deportation

In serious violation of the Peace Agreement signed by the two countries, and relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Ethiopian Government has deported 722 Eritreans and one Ethiopian. The deportees arrived at the Mereb River on 25 June 2001. Most of the deportees are women, children and old people. Some suffer from serious disability.

Most of the deportees were rounded up from their homes and working places in Tigray and imprisoned in various places of detention for days before being deported. Some had been detained for as long as three years, including in places which were never visited by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The deportees were forced to leave behind members of their families and their belongings.

The deportation carried out by the Ethiopian authorities takes place at a time when much effort is exerted to normalize relations between, and to build confidence among, the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The Government of the State of Eritrea urges the international community in general and the partners of the Eritro-Ethiopian peace process in particular to condemn the latest violation of human rights conventions and international humanitarian laws as well as the comprehensive Peace Agreement between the two countries. It must be recognized that these violations seriously jeopardize the peace process.

Over the past years the Ethiopian Government has deported over 76,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin.

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2 July 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 28 June 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Appended to the Minister's letter is a table showing violations of Iraq's international boundaries committed by United States and British warplanes flying across the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 9 to 22 June 2001.

The Minister urges you to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full and to report these violations to the Security Council through you, given that they constitute wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations, and he asks you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt the aggression and hold the aggressors accountable for it under international law.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43554 (E) 030701 050701

Annex to the letter dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our letter dated 14 June 2001 (S/2001/602, annex), I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes committed 187 violations of Iraq's international boundaries from Kuwait by way of the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 9 to 22 June 2001. On the basis of the table appended to this letter, the relevant Iraqi authorities have determined that the violations committed were as follows:

1. Armed and hostile aerial activity by the United States and the United Kingdom, violating our international boundaries by way of the demilitarized zone, comprised 187 sorties in the following governorates: Basrah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit and Maysan.

2. Our technical systems identified the aircraft violating Iraq's airspace on an almost daily basis as American F-14s, F-15s, F-16s and F-18s and British Tornadoes.

3. All of the armed and hostile sorties that violated Iraq's airspace by way of the demilitarized zone received support from an AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi Arabian airspace and an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace.

4. A total of 11 remotely piloted aircraft violated Iraq's airspace from Kuwait by way of the demilitarized zone between 9 and 22 June 2001.

All of the violations in question were committed by way of the demilitarized zone in which UNIKOM is stationed. One of UNIKOM's primary responsibilities is to monitor such hostile military operations and to report them and endeavour to halt them immediately.

The violations being committed by United States and British military aircraft, in which 10 to 20 of them are used daily, are tantamount to an undeclared war. It is imperative that the United Nations should take the measures that are required in their regard under the Charter, so that the aggression may be halted and those who have committed the violations may be charged with full international responsibility for them, including liability for payment of compensation to Iraq.

The statements of UNIKOM to the effect that it is unable to monitor or identify these aircraft cannot be maintained in the light of the scientific and technological capabilities that are available or that UNIKOM is in a position to obtain and utilize in order to fulfil the requirements of its mandate by establishing the identity and country of the warplanes that are violating Iraq's sovereign airspace and thence taking deterrent measures against the aggressors.

I accordingly urge you once more to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full and to report these violations to the Security Council through you immediately they occur, given that they constitute wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations, and I ask you to alert the Security Council to its

responsibility to halt the aggression and hold the aggressors accountable for it under international law.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

Hostile aerial activity violating Iraq's international boundaries from Kuwait, 9-22 June 2001

No.	*Date*	*From*	*Time*	*Type*	*Sorties*	*Altitude (metres)*	*Speed (km/h)*	*Areas overflown*
1	9-15 June	Kuwait	0900-1200	F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18	132 (with 4 drones)	10,000-11,000	180-780	Basrah, Lasaf, Artawi, Kut, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Qurnah
2	16-22 June	Kuwait	0925-2320	F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18	55 (including 7 drones)	6,500-10,500	180-780	Artawi, Hayy, Basrah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Qurnah, Samawah, Rifa'i, Jalibah

Total sorties: 187

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Security Council

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2 July 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 28 June 2001 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 12 to 21 June 2001 they carried out 350 sorties, 88 of them from Saudi Arabia, 130 from Kuwait and 132 from Turkey.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this unwarranted aggression and ensuring that it does not recur.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 28 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you that United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They carried out 350 sorties in the period from 12 to 21 June 2001, 88 of them from Saudi Arabia, 130 from Kuwait and 132 from Turkey, as shown hereunder.

1. In the northern region 132 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1140 hours on 12 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 18 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Aqrah, Mosul, Amadiyah, Tall Afar, Baibo, Sinjar, Rawanduz and Dokan areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1515 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1215 hours on 14 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, Amadiyah, Sinjar and Aqrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1545 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1200 hours on 15 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 24 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Baibo, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Mosul, Sinjar, Tall Afar, Zakho, Irbil, Rawanduz, Qal'at Dizah and Dokan areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1430 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1100 hours on 18 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 22 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Sinjar and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1400 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1045 hours on 19 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar, Aqrah, Sinjar and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1345 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1035 hours on 20 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's

airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Baibo, Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Sinjar and Mosul areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1235 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1216 hours on 21 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out eight missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Baibo and Aqrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1300 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 218 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 0900 hours on 12 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 33 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 21 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Jalibah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Lasaf, Qal`at Salih, Basrah, Umm Qasr, Qurnah, Shatrah, Salman and Shinafiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1035 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 0815 hours on 13 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 57 missions, 22 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 35 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Lasaf, Artawi, Jalibah, Qal`at Salih, Basrah, Nasiriyah, Diwaniyah, Shinafiyah, Najaf, Amarah, Qal`at Sukkar, Ashbajah, Samawah, Salman and Nukhayb areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1140 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 0910 hours on 14 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 51 missions, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 37 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Diwaniyah, Hayy, Qal`at Sukkar, Kut, Amarah, Basrah, Jassan, Jalibah and Artawi areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1150 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1010 hours on 17 June 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out five missions, four of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft

operating inside Saudi airspace and one from the Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew areas 15 kilometres south of Busayyah. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1250 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1245 hours on 18 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 37 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 25 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Nasiriyah, Salman, Kut, Najaf, Amarah, Diwaniyah, Jalibah and Artawi areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1630 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1300 hours on 19 June 2001, United States and British F-14, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 35 missions, 24 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 11 from Kuwaiti territory by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Diwaniyah, Najaf, Rutbah, Walid, Nukhayb and Jalibah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1540 hours, drove them off.

This aggression illustrates the bellicose attitude being maintained by the United States of America and the United Kingdom towards Iraq. Since 1992, it has become a fixed policy aimed at undermining the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and at the systematic and concerted destruction of Iraqi lives, infrastructure and civilian installations. It is a policy that has been affirmed in successive statements made by United States and British officials.

The Government of Iraq categorically rejects the two so-called no-flight zones, which were imposed by unilateral decision of the United States and the United Kingdom and lack any legal basis. Iraq rejects all the consequences of this illegal decision and, in particular, the flimsy excuses and pretexts used by these States in an attempt to justify their military aggression against our country.

The logistic support provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey to the Americans and the British has made these countries key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they bear full international responsibility under international law. This includes liability for full compensation for the loss and damage, in both human and material terms, that is caused by these illegal practices.

The Government of Iraq further renews its call to the countries participating in this aggression to desist forthwith from internationally prohibited acts that violate Iraq's sovereignty, place its security and integrity in grave danger and pose a direct and serious threat to international peace and security.

As it condemns these acts of aggression against Iraqi targets and installations, the Government of Iraq urges you to perform the duties assigned to you [under the Charter] as they relate to the maintenance of international peace and security by intervening with the governments of the countries in question with a view to inducing them to halt, end and desist from any resumption of their constant and unwarranted aggression against an independent, sovereign State.

(*Signed*) Tariq **Aziz**
Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2001/651

Security Council

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2 July 2001

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Letter dated 29 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the statement by H.E. Mr. Riaz Al-Qeissi, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq, in the 4336th (resumed) meeting of the Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait on 28 June 2001, in which he referred to the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and urged the Council to take action with a view to disarming Iran of the said weapons.

I would like to place on record the total rejection by my Government of the baseless allegations contained in the said statement. It is ironic, indeed, that an official of a Government that has extensively resorted to the use of chemical weapons in the 1980s, and has never spared any efforts in having access to weapons of mass destruction comes up with advice, in the very same field, for the Council against my country, which has not only been the victim of documented Iraqi resort to chemical weapons, but has also meticulously abided by all its obligations in the field of elimination and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The use by the Iraqi forces of chemical weapons, in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, against the Iranian servicemen and civilians in the 1980s is widely known and has been condemned by the international community. Moreover, the images of those innocent Iraqi nationals, in the Iraqi city of Halabcha, gassed to death by their own armed forces could never be wiped out from the memory of the world's public opinion, incidents that are recorded, among others, in Security Council resolution 612 (1988) and 620 (1988) as well. Nor could members of the international community, especially Iraq's neighbouring countries, ever be oblivious to evidences uncovered by the United Nations Special Commission in the 1990s, which pointed explicitly to the extent of the Iraqi non-conventional arms programmes. The declaration, on numerous occasions, of the production, development and stockpiling of huge amounts of biological and chemical weapons by the Government of Iraq and mounting them on warheads are also fully recorded.

As to the intention of the Islamic Republic of Iran, let it suffice to recall that, unlike Iraq, Iran is a party to all international regimes on weapons of mass destruction. It has signed, ratified and faithfully complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran has also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Iran's facilities are regularly inspected, as provided for by the various disarmament treaties and

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conventions, by appropriate international authorities, and the reports that have followed all these inspections testify to full compliance with the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Regrettably, at the same time, it is a matter of grave concern for us and other countries in our neighbourhood that Iraq still continues to refrain from even signing the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons.

The international community should, indeed, take appropriate measures to ensure that Iraq makes a long-term legally binding undertaking by becoming a party to the relevant international agreements. It is also beneficial to recall that the Islamic Republic of Iran has always called for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, which has been endorsed repeatedly by the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad Hasan **Fadaifard**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2001/652

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 July 2001

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including its resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, 1330 (2000) of 5 December 2000 and 1352 (2001) of 1 June 2001, as they relate to the improvement of the humanitarian programme for Iraq,

Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by the Government of Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,

Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,

Determined to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that the provisions of resolution 986 (1995), except those contained in paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 and subject to paragraph 15 of resolution 1284 (1999), shall remain in force for a new period of 150 days beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Daylight Time, on 4 July 2001;

2. *Further decides* that from the sum produced from the import by States of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions related thereto, in the 150-day period referred to in paragraph 1 above, the amounts recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 1 February 1998 (S/1998/90) for the food/nutrition and health sectors should continue to be allocated on a priority basis in the context of the activities of the Secretariat, of which 13 per cent of the sum produced in the period referred to above shall be used for the purposes referred to in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995);

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the actions necessary to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of this resolution, and to continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq in

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such a way as to provide the required assurance to the Council that the goods produced in accordance with this resolution are distributed equitably and that all supplies authorized for procurement, including dual usage items and spare parts, are utilized for the purpose for which they have been authorized, including in the housing sector and related infrastructure development;

4. *Decides* to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the 150-day period, and expresses its intention, prior to the end of the 150-day period, to consider favourably renewal of the provisions of this resolution as appropriate, provided that the reports referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 below indicate that those provisions are being satisfactorily implemented;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive report to the Council 90 days after the date of entry into force of this resolution on its implementation and again at least one week prior to the end of the 150-day period, on the basis of observations of United Nations personnel in Iraq, and of consultations with the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, financed in accordance with paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 986 (1995), including in his reports any observations which he may have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs;

6. *Requests* the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in close consultation with the Secretary-General, to report to the Council 90 days after the entry into force of paragraph 1 above and prior to the end of the 150-day period on the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995);

7. *Decides* that from the funds produced pursuant to this resolution in the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995), up to a total of 600 million United States dollars may be used to meet any reasonable expenses, other than expenses payable in Iraq, which follow directly from the contracts approved in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998 and paragraph 18 of resolution 1284 (1999), and expresses its intention to consider favourably the renewal of this measure;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to transfer the excess funds drawn from the account created pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 986 (1995) for the purposes set out in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 986 (1995) in order to increase the funds available for humanitarian purchases, including as appropriate the purposes referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 1284 (1999);

9. *Decides* that the effective deduction rate of the funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be transferred to the Compensation Fund in the 150-day period shall be 25 per cent, further decides that the additional funds resulting from this decision will be deposited into the account established under paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 986 (1995) to be used for strictly humanitarian projects to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq as referred to in paragraph 126 of the report of the Secretary-General of 29 November 2000 (S/2000/1132), requests the Secretary-General to report on the use of these funds in his reports referred to in paragraph 5 above, and expresses its intention to

establish a mechanism to review, before the end of the 150-day period, the effective deduction rate of the funds deposited in the escrow account to be transferred to the Compensation Fund in future phases, taking into account the key elements of the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people;

10. *Urges* all States, and in particular the Government of Iraq, to provide their full cooperation in the effective implementation of this resolution;

11. *Calls upon* the Government of Iraq to take the remaining steps necessary to implement paragraph 27 of resolution 1284 (1999), and further requests the Secretary-General to include in his reports under paragraph 5 above a review of the progress made by the Government of Iraq in the implementation of these measures;

12. *Stresses* the need to continue to ensure respect for the security and safety of all persons directly involved in the implementation of this resolution in Iraq;

13. *Appeals* to all States to continue to cooperate in the timely submission of applications and expeditious issue of export licences, facilitating the transit of humanitarian supplies authorized by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and to take all other appropriate measures within their competence in order to ensure that urgently needed humanitarian supplies reach the Iraqi people as rapidly as possible;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 40
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that on Saturday, 30 June 2001, the ministers for foreign affairs of Lebanon and Syria held consultations on the latest Israeli threats and that the two ministries subsequently issued the statement I am transmitting to you herewith (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sélim **Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43621 (E) 050701 050701

Annex to the letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement issued in Beirut and Damascus on 30 June 2001 following consultations between Mr. Mahmoud Hammoud, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, and Mr. Farouk Al-Shara', Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, following the latest Israeli threats

We have noted the statements made by officials in Israel concerning yesterday's act of resistance to the Israeli occupation in the occupied Lebanese Shab'a farmlands and the allegations made in those statements concerning the weapons used by the resistance against the Israeli occupation. We have also noted the Israeli threats against Syria and Lebanon that have been made despite the statement conveyed to Lebanon yesterday by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the effect that Israel had undertaken to cease its violations of Lebanon's airspace.

In this connection we should like international public opinion and the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, to be aware of the following:

1. The defensive weapons that the resistance possesses cannot be compared with the weapons of mass destruction that Israel has and that it constantly uses to threaten Lebanon and Syria. The weapons of the resistance are not comparable with the Israeli warplanes that patrol the skies of Lebanon on a daily basis, that attack its people, its territory and its infrastructure and that are constantly violating Lebanon's international boundaries. The weapons of the resistance also do not compare with the heavy artillery and battle tanks that kill innocent people, destroy homes and set fire to woodlands and forests. These attacks constitute a provocation that must be condemned. They represent aggression against Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and an international community that believes in a just and comprehensive peace must put an end to it.

2. Both before Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 and subsequently, Lebanon has affirmed its right under the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant international covenants to liberate its territory using all legitimate means.

3. Lebanon and Syria reject these threats, they will hold Israel responsible for the consequences of any new aggression and for the repercussions it might have in the region as a whole, and they alert the international community to the danger of these threats for the deteriorating situation in the region and for international peace and security.

4. Lebanon and Syria affirm their commitment to international legitimacy, to the Madrid formula, to the necessary implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978), and to the principle of land for peace. This is our fixed and established position with a view to achieving the goals for which we strive.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

On the afternoon of Sunday, 1 July 2001, Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace and attacked a radar position belonging to the Syrian Arab forces operating in Lebanon in the Duhur al-Ayrun locality of the Bekaa. Two members of the Syrian forces were wounded, as was an enlisted man in the Lebanese Army.

This new attack provides further confirmation of Israel's belligerent character and highlights its violations of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sélim **Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations A/55/1008–S/2001/655

General Assembly
Security Council

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3 July 2001

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 156 and 164

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 29 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

A letter dated 6 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations has been circulated as a document of the General Assembly and as a document of the Security Council (A/55/984-S/2001/569), in what seems to be a convoluted reply to my letter of 4 May 2001 (A/55/931-S/2001/456) concerning a recent decision taken by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

To repeat, the said court has sentenced Mourad Topalian, an Armenian activist and former chairman of the Armenian National Committee of America, to 37 months of imprisonment on two counts of terrorism-linked federal crimes, basing its decision on the irrefutable findings of competent United States authorities. Specifically, the explosive material used in the car bombing on 12 October 1980 at the United Nations Plaza wounding five people and causing great damage to several buildings has been linked to the explosive material stored by Topalian. The details supplied in my letter of 4 May left no doubt that this specific court decision had direct relevance to two General Assembly resolutions under the heading "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives" and "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", i.e. agenda items 156 and 164. Hence the sole intent and purport of my previous letter.

To be precise, my letter did not contain a single reference to the Republic of Armenia. I did register, on the other hand, the official finding of the United States federal authorities that the ultra-nationalist Armenian terrorist group called the "Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide" is the military wing of the Dashnak Party in Yerevan, Armenia, and that the above-referred Armenian National Committee of America an affiliate of the same. I should further underline that these connections are not revealed for the first time by the decision of the said district

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court but had been already well documented in scholarly studies including the works of Mr. Michael Gunter, who provided ample evidence from the Dashnak press to that effect.

The "venturing in a very unambiguous context inadmissible within the walls of the United Nations," to use the words of the Permanent Representative of Armenia, is a deceitful statement; a bare attempt, in fact, to conceal the real motivation of availing himself of the opportunity to seize a single reference in order to pour out hatred and propagate Armenian falsifications within the walls of the United Nations.

Apparently, even when conveying to the international community important disclosures that have a direct bearing on working agenda items of the General Assembly, a mere reference to the city of Yerevan as the seat of the Dashnak Party is a sufficiently powerful incentive to engage the Permanent Representative of Armenia in linguistic diatribes.

The language employed by the Permanent Representative of Armenia transgresses the basic and time-honoured rules governing civilized conversation between States. Sadly, I no longer expect such compliance from the representative of a country which, anyhow, remained bellicose and irredentist from the very first day of its independence, and which, to this date, occupies one fourth of the territory of its neighbour to the east, Azerbaijan.

Furthermore, the Permanent Representative of Armenia, with remarkable ease of mind, fails to see the essence and thrust of my letter directed towards increased international cooperation to prevent acts of terrorism against diplomatic and consular representatives and missions, as well as international cooperation against terrorism. Instead, the Permanent Representative of Armenia brings forth the accusation that I attempted to link "official Yerevan with certain individual acts of desperation". Let me be very explicit on this point: If I ever feel the need to refer to a link between terrorism and the Armenian Government, I will do exactly that and leave no room for ambiguity.

If Armenia's stance against terrorism is sincere, then it would be worth their while to study the reasons which led the district court to its decision. Trying to label unrepentant terrorism as "individual acts of desperation", on the other hand, is a felony. Only those who are brainwashed enough to believe that ends justify means are capable of regarding a total of more than 230 armed attacks killing 70 innocent people, including 31 Turkish diplomats, and wounding 524 civilians as "individual acts"; and only those, I would like to add, can claim such unabashed defence of evil.

The terrorist acts in question were in fact directed at the same target, namely, Turkish citizens and/or representations, and were coordinated through a maze of complex networks. The car bombing act at the United Nations Plaza, for instance, was carried out on the same day when three other terrorist acts took place in different countries against Turkish representations. While this is the objective reality, the Permanent Representative of Armenia portrays them as "individual acts", and goes on blessing such cold-blooded crimes by pronouncing that these were "aimed at drawing the attention of the world community to the Turkish Government's denial of the fact of the Genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923". I do not find surprising, after all, that such a perplexed handling of reality ends up by accepting degrees of terrorism where there can be none. This ambiguity towards terrorist methods devalues in a very significant way

the assurances brought forth by the Permanent Representative of Armenia in the latter paragraphs of his letter concerning their stance against terrorism. Remarkably, the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia neither refers to nor condemns the terrorist crime perpetrated by Topalian which was the subject matter of my previous letter in the first place.

As a matter of fact, the whole purpose of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia is to reiterate in an aggressive manner the "nationalist Armenian version" of events that took place during the First World War, a blackened era for all the peoples of Anatolia, indeed for humankind.

Finally, the Permanent Representative of Armenia, in yet another twisting of words, intents and places claims that the political wing of the terrorist organization "Grey Wolves", of which Ali Ağça, the terrorist who made an attempt on the life of the Pope in 1981, was a member, makes up part of the current government coalition in Turkey. This is indeed stretching the limits of imagination too far. The political party in question disavowed Ali Ağça two decades ago. The fact is that Ali Ağça is still in prison in Turkey today.

The letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia contains several allegations along with language that accuses Turkey of "juggling" with historical data. In order to shed light on the actual course of events which were referred to, I deem it necessary to provide the information annexed herewith.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 156 and 164, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Umit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 29 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

It is a fact that after nearly 700 years of peaceful coexistence throughout which the Turkish and Armenian communities enriched each other culturally, socially, economically and otherwise, all the while enjoying exemplary mutual respect — for the want of which we today have to witness ethnic cleansings and carnage in various parts of the world — the two communities saw their relationship fall apart at the turn of the last century at the instigation of the imperialist Powers of the time.

There are hundreds of scholarly works describing the ill-fated designs of the imperialist Powers of the time on the already debilitated Ottoman Empire. I would like to refer to I. V. Bestuzhev's article entitled "Russian Foreign Policy, February-June 1914", which appeared in *1914: The Coming of the First World War*, edited by Walter Laqueur and George Mosse:

> "The move towards a rapprochement with Turkey after the Balkan Wars turned out to be highly unpopular in Russian bourgeois-landlord circles, which were now coming out in favour of a final division of the Ottoman Empire. With this object in view, an entire system of measures was worked out to strengthen Russian influence in Turkey. It contemplated the formation of an autonomous Armenia under Russian protection as the most powerful means of exerting pressure."

Eventually, thousands of armed Armenians did in fact spearhead a massive Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia, faithfully fulfilling the promise given to Tsar Nicholas II by the President of the Armenian national Bureau on 5 November 1914 in Tbilisi: "From all countries Armenians are hurrying to enter the ranks of the glorious Russian army, with their blood to serve the victory of the Russian arms."

The Armenian rebellion began in late 1914. More than 15,000 Anatolian Armenians who went to the Russian South Caucasus for training returned to join the local rebels. Telegraph lines were cut; roads through strategic mountain passes were seized; hundreds of Ottoman officials were attacked, particularly recruiting officers, throughout the east; outlying villages were assaulted. In the service of the Tsarist armies, they seized the city of Van in March 1915 from a weak Ottoman garrison and proceeded to kill 60,000 Turks.

Boghos Nubar, one of the foremost leaders of the Armenians was telling the truth in his letter to *The Times* of London, published on 30 January 1919, begging the allies at the Paris Conference to recognize the "service" of the Armenians:

> "The Armenians have been, since the beginning of the war, de facto belligerents, since they fought alongside the Allies on all fronts, in Palestine and Syria, where the Armenian volunteers recruited by the Armenian National Delegation at the request of the French Government, made up more than half of the French contingent. In the Caucasus, without mentioning the 15,000 Armenians in the Imperial Russian Army, more than 40,000 of their volunteers offered resistance to the Turkish armies."

It is no secret that on the second day of August 1914, the long-running sense of malaise in Europe came to a head and open and secret alliances designed to preserve or to overturn the balance of power in Europe came into operation, starting the massacre of the peoples of Europe. The Ottoman Empire, during the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, did not take part in the alliance system that wrecked Europe. To be precise, it was the Ottoman Empire itself which was regarded as easy prey within the wider imperialist designs and aspirations of the major Powers. The Empire was not among the six ranking European Powers of the time, and it had been under attack since July 1911.

At the time, nations living within the fold of the multi-ethnic empires, including the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy and the Russian Empire, generally sought to better their lot as nationalism was the fashion of the day. However, the Armenian nationalistic movement was captured by its war-mongering elements ready to start armed rebellion and employ terrorist tactics.

Powers vying for the territories of the Ottoman Empire indeed found a willing collaborator in the ultra-

nationalist Armenian leadership, which, at such a historic juncture, forsook the true and lasting interests of their people, threw all the peoples of eastern Anatolia into imminent danger knowingly risking widespread communal violence in their haste to carve out an independent Armenia.

One should ask to what extent the Armenian leadership of the time bloodied its hands by totally disregarding the dangers inherent in fomenting violence and revolution at a time of war and became responsible for the tragedy that befell the peoples of Anatolia, including those on whose behalf they pretended to speak. Clearly, the actions of the Armenian rebels exacerbated the growing division and mutual fear between the Turks and Armenians of the Ottoman East. After all, outright terror was the chosen weapon of Armenian rebels, and the lands they coveted were overwhelmingly Turkish and Muslim in population.

The Armenian falsifiers today commemorate 24 April 1915 as an august date in the history of their struggle, conveniently forgetting that the Allied fleet had arrived at the head of the Gallipoli peninsula only three days before, on 21 April 1915, presenting a tremendous threat to the country whose citizens, at the ranks of Foreign Minister, ambassadors, and thousands of accomplished people in all walks of life, along with the peasantry, were leading an uncomplicated life until the call for arms and rebellion wrecked stability.

As a matter of fact, the Armenian falsifiers conveniently disregard so many facts essential to a humane, spirited, forward-looking and constructive understanding of the tragic events which took place within the fold of a dying and partly occupied country, that as a result, only hatred and rage, unfortunately, govern their general attitude towards the Turks.

In an article that appeared in the *New York Review of Books* on 8 April 1999, the eminent writer Ian Buruma highlighted some controversial aspects of the focus on identity through victimization in contemporary society. Buruma does not negate the memory of suffering, but he questions "when a culture, ethnic, religious or national community bases its communal identity almost entirely on the sentimental solidarity of remembered victimhood, on the way lies historical myopia and, in extreme circumstances, even vendetta". The problem, as Buruma sees it, is that this "sense of victimization impedes understanding among people; it cannot result in mutual understanding".

It is because of this predicament that the falsifiers would not see that the Armenians who lived in cities where Ottoman control remained intact in western Anatolia were neither deported nor molested; that when the Tsarist armies attacked and occupied eastern Anatolia, more than a million Turks and Muslims had to flee as refugees and were attacked on the roads by Armenian bands; that there was a collapse of authority in eastern Anatolia in the wake of the Tsarist assaults; that killings and massacres were done mutually.

The Armenian falsifiers would rather prefer to claim that if any single Turk was killed during these tragic times, then that was strictly due to self-defence, that no civilian Turks were murdered, raped or pillaged whereas even the Tsarist officers were horrified to see the frenzy of massacring defenceless Turks perpetrated by armed Armenian gangs and paramilitaries in the most vicious manner.

The Armenian falsifiers would reject the description of the above-cited tragic events as civil war and inter-communal violence, because they would like us to ignore the Turkish suffering, and solely focus on Armenian suffering.

As one of the most respected scholars on the history of the Middle East, Professor Bernard Lewis, wrote for *Ha'aretz* on 23 January 1998:

> "The Armenians want to benefit from both worlds. On the one hand, they speak with pride of their struggle against Ottoman despotism, while on the other hand, they compare their tragedy with the Jewish Holocaust."

Even one dead is too many, Turkish or Armenian! But it was a civil war within a world war, where all sides party to the conflict suffered terribly. In the same area, at the same time, and under the same conditions, nearly 3 million Turks and other Muslims perished due to killings, starvation and epidemics.

In bringing forth the question of guilt for this all-encompassing human disaster, fabrications of documents have been taken as truth and authentic documents have been ignored as a result of nationalistic Armenian activism. Unsubstantiated assertions and wartime propaganda have been accepted, whereas the brief of wartime propagandists was simply to make the enemies look as bad as

possible, and make themselves and their friends look as good as could be. This is why the Armenian falsifiers still use the tainted and one-sided documents distributed by the wartime British propaganda machine prepared by the War Propaganda Bureau stationed throughout the war years at Wellington House in London.

Likewise, historians who attempted to find out the truth have been called "genocide deniers". A climate has been created in which historians fear to examine history because of feared personal results. Politicians have decided that they can legislate history, even though they know little or nothing of that history. Slogans have replaced historical judgement.

The Armenian falsifiers are yet to produce a single authentic Ottoman Government dispatch ordering the killing of Armenians. The alleged "genocide of 1.5 million Armenians" should have left countless pieces of evidence that would have saved the Armenian falsifiers from relying upon wartime propaganda, one-sided stories of Christian missionaries who mostly listened to Christian Armenians and not the Muslim Turks, as well as depending solely upon the truly heart-breaking stories of the survivors. It would help them immensely to hear the Turkish side of this argument instead of calling for honouring some of the dead and not all of the dead.

The Permanent Representative of Armenia challenges us that we are "not in a position to disprove with the help of historical data the irrefutable fact of the Genocide". I would take this statement as the normal outcome of their particular world view. If the facts do not fit their theories, the falsifier nationalists would ignore them and look for other ways to make their case. If relying on wartime propaganda and totally ignoring the massacres of the Turks at the hands of the Armenian armed bands proves inadequate at the end of the day to convince those who rightfully demand robust historical data, evidence and analysis, then the falsifiers would say, as is the case for the Permanent Representative of Armenia, that "Ankara attempts to revive the medieval practice of blaming for the violence the very victims of the violence, in the hope that the endless repetition of the lie will make it true". After all, in the pursuit of radical nationalist agendas, there are no limits set for committing intellectual crimes.

Turkey has never blamed thousands of innocent Armenian individuals, women and children who perished in that era for finding themselves unaided and at peril because of a radical politics in which they did not make part. But we do blame the so-called nationalist revolutionaries who have fomented war, sided by invading enemy armies, killed innocent people because of their race and religion, thus beginning the action in the full knowledge that they were thereby achieving their objective of creating two warring sides. The majority of the Armenians had no wish for war, but they had been driven into it by their senseless, revolutionary, radical and nationalist leadership acting hand in hand with armed bands.

We do blame those who refuse to this day to see the Turkish suffering; propagate that the Turks were and are evil personified; fail to take honourably their part of the onus; refuse even to glance at documents which do not fit their world view, and which do not promote their own political ends.

I can further, in the words of the Permanent Representative of Armenia, "deliberately falsify and juggle with historical and political realities:"

The British were the closest party to these events, because they were the principal occupying Power of the Ottoman Empire and its capital, Istanbul. They had full control of the Ottoman Archives. As such, the British led an in-depth investigation against 144 highly placed Ottoman officials including Ministers, who were charged with war crimes against the Armenians. Subsequently, 56 out of the 144 accused were deported to the island of Malta to stand trial. After a wide-scale and frantic search of all the archival material, Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul, wrote to London that the "evidence against the deportees are [sic] very few. Under these circumstances, the prosecution finds itself under grave disadvantage". But he added that "he hoped that the American Government could supply a large amount of documentary information". (FO/371/6500/E.3557)

In failing to find any legally acceptable evidence against the deportees, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, informed Geddes, the British Ambassador at Washington, that there was "considerable difficulty" in establishing proof of guilt against the Turkish detainees at Malta, and requested him "to ascertain if the United States Government is in

possession of any evidence that could be of value for the purpose of prosecution". (FO/371/6502/E.5845)

On 13 July 1921, the British Embassy at Washington gave the following reply:

> "I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at Malta. Having regard to this stipulation and the fact that the reports in the possession of the Department of State do not appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful for the purposes of corroborating information already in possession of His Majesty's Government, I fear that nothing is to be hoped from addressing any further inquiries to the United States Government in this matter". (FO/371/6504/E.8519)

Subsequently, all charges against the Ottoman detainees were dismissed.

More recently, on 14 April 1999, Foreign Office spokesperson Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale said the following:

> "The British Government had condemned the massacres at the time. But in the absence of unequivocal evidence that the Ottoman Administration took a specific decision to eliminate the Armenians under their control at that time, British Governments have not recognized those events as indications of genocide. Nor do we believe it is the business of Governments of today to review events of over 80 years ago, with a view to pronouncing on them."

Furthermore, acting on behalf of the British Government, Baroness Scotland of Asthal said the following in a written response on 7 February 2001:

> "The Government, in line with previous British Governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide, a Convention which was drafted in response to the Holocaust and is not retrospective in application. The interpretation of events in eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians."

So much for "the process of achieving international recognition of the Genocide of Armenians which has appreciably gained momentum" according to the Permanent Representative of Armenia. One should ask why a handful of 30-plus deputies out of nearly 600 parliamentarians were present when the French Parliament voted on the so-called Genocide Resolution. The Permanent Representative of Armenia should keep in mind the future when the realities of a terrible war in which millions on all sides died will no longer be ignored, and when a very different picture will emerge as politics are avoided and the standard procedures of historical analysis are applied to this question. It will be seen then that there is a vast difference between history written to defend one-sided nationalist convictions and what true historical analysis should be.

Indeed, in presenting the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide for ratification, the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized that genocide is a crime of "specific intent", requiring conclusive proof.

I hope that the above information contributes to the correct perception of the First World War era events in eastern Anatolia.

United Nations A/56/131–S/2001/656

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 July 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Item 179 of the preliminary list*
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest acts of terrorism committed by Palestinians over the last several days.

Shortly after 8 a.m. (local time) this morning, two car bombs exploded in the Tel Aviv suburb of Yehud, one of them in close proximity to a day-care centre. Six pedestrians were wounded in the attack, two of whom were admitted to the hospital to be treated for shock.

Several hours earlier, Israel intercepted three Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists en route to carry out a terrorist attack inside Israel. All three terrorists had previously been involved in planning and implementing terrorist attacks against Israelis and were travelling in a car packed with explosives. By eliminating these three terrorists, Israeli forces undoubtedly prevented yet another act of gruesome carnage from being perpetrated on the streets of Israel.

This past Thursday, 28 June 2001, Palestinian gunmen ambushed an Israeli vehicle carrying two women and a child. Katya Weintraub, age 27, was killed after being shot in the chest as she returned home with her son Ariel, age 4, from a doctor's appointment. Yehudit Eliahu, age 47, suffered a compound fracture after being shot in the legs.

On Tuesday, 26 June 2001, Palestinian gunmen opened heavy fire on Jewish residents of Hebron. In the course of the shooting, David Struk, age 7, was wounded by a bullet as he played on the balcony of his family's home. Earlier that day, Palestinian gunmen, firing from the village of El-Khader, opened fire on a bus travelling to Jerusalem, wounding two Israeli women.

On Friday, 22 June 2001, two Israeli soldiers were on patrol when they were beckoned to come to the assistance of a vehicle that was apparently stuck in the sand. As they approached, a Palestinian suicide bomber detonated an explosive killing Sgt. Aviv Iszak and Sgt. Ofir Kit, both aged 19.

* A/56/50.

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In addition, Palestinian mortar attacks on Israeli communities have continued on a near-daily basis. Israeli soldiers continue to be targeted by Palestinian gunmen and a number have been wounded over the last several days.

These attacks are merely the latest attacks in a more than nine-month campaign of Palestinian terrorism that has been detailed in my letters dated 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

These attacks also come as Israel is acting to implement the Tenet ceasefire. Israel continues to confine its military action to the realm of self-defence and has taken steps to alleviate the situation of the general Palestinian population by lifting closures around the cities of Jericho, Qalqilia, Jenin, Tulkarm and Nablus. Israeli troops have redeployed from a number of locations and roadblocks have been dismantled, opening roads to Palestinian traffic. In addition, the international crossings at Rafah and Allenby have been opened to Palestinian commercial and civilian traffic. All these steps have been taken despite ongoing Palestinian attacks that jeopardize the success of the ceasefire.

Israel reiterates its call upon the Palestinian leadership to adhere to the terms of the ceasefire as outlined in the Tenet plan and to take immediate and concerted action to control all acts of violence emanating from the territory under its control.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 179 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/ES-10/93–S/2001/657

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 July 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, continues to pursue its policy of extrajudicial killing of Palestinian civilians. Yesterday night, three more Palestinians were assassinated when Israeli helicopter gunships fired several rockets at their car with the intent of killing the passengers: Mohammed Ahmed Besharat, Ayoub Besharat and Sameh Anwar Abu Hineish, in the vicinity of the village of Qabatiye near the town of Jenin. Also yesterday, Israeli occupying forces killed two Palestinians and claimed that the killing was a result of an exchange of fire. In addition, a 15-year-old Palestinian boy died yesterday from bullet wounds sustained on Friday, 29 June 2001.

The above-mentioned assassinations are additional war crimes committed by Israeli occupying forces for which the Government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is fully responsible. The Israeli Government effectively continues with its war crimes, State terrorism and all kinds of atrocities against the Palestinian people, putting the ceasefire agreement and the plan for implementation of the recommendations of the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) in serious jeopardy.

We believe that the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, must fulfil their responsibility vis-à-vis the current situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, irrespective of the efforts exerted by other parties. The Security Council should play its role in stopping the continuous Israeli military campaign against the Palestinian people and in bringing all Israeli atrocities to an effective end.

Since my last letter to you on 25 June 2001 (A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629), seven more Palestinians have been killed, including the martyrs mentioned above. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.) Regretfully, this brings the total number of Palestinian martyrs killed since 28 September 2000 to

01-43733 (E) 030701

a total of 512 people. At the same time, the total number of Palestinian civilians injured, many severely and permanently, also continues to rise each day.

I am writing this letter in follow-up to my previous 52 letters addressed to you regarding this grave and ongoing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 25 June 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; and A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629).

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, Wednesday, 27 June, through Sunday, 1 July 2001*

Wednesday, 27 June 2001

Mahmoud Mustafa Mahmoud Emtier (17 years old)

Sunday, 1 July 2001

1. Jamal Dif Allah Hasan Thleiji
2. Mahmoud Musa Jalad
3. Ahmed Mahmoud Yassin (15 years old)
4. Mohammed Ahmed Besharat
5. Ayoub Besharat
6. Sameh Anwar Abu Hineish

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* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 512.

United Nations S/2001/6

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 July 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that 139 unexploded cluster bombs, missiles, other ordnance and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines left behind by the 1991 30-nation aggression against Iraq were found and rendered harmless in all parts of Iraq in the period from 1 April to 31 May 2001. They were found in the following governorates: Wasit, Dhi Qar, Salah al-Din, Najaf, Basrah, Anbar and Ninawa.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43768 (E) 030701 050701

United Nations S/2001/659

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 July 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a number of tables containing statistical data for the health sector to which reference was made by Mr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his statement to the Security Council on 28 June 2001. I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **A-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-43983 (E) 050701 050701

Annex to the letter dated 2 July 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Stutas For Arrived Items for The Eighth Phases until 19/6/2001

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Phase	Article	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
first	durgs	135838749	0	135838749	151795487	89.49%	180038167	0	180038167	198987025	210000000	90.48%	85.73%
	appliancess	35741787	0	35741787	39283404	90.98%							
	spare parts	8457631	0	8457631	8783411	96.29%							
second	durgs	85301000	0	86301000	95020709	90.82%	187348694	0	187348694	202424721	210000000	92.55%	89.21%
	appliancess	90061867	0	90061867	95645034	94.16%							
	spare parts	11985827	0	10985827	11758978	93.43%							
thrid	durgs	78771201	0	78771201	96437322	81.68%	163585351	0	163585351	184931103	200000000	88.46%	81.79%
	appliancess	75522175	0	75522175	76290827	98.99%							
	spare parts	9291975	0	9291975	12212210	76.09%							
forth	durgs	61997257	0	61997257	78378329	79.10%	136682685	0	136682685	159376674	169000000	85.76%	80.88%
	appliancess	61377511	0	61377511	61540594	99.73%							
	spare parts	13307917	0	13307917	22394972	59.42%							
fiveth	durgs	59331467	150184	59481651	74136891	80.23%	174330384	150184	174480568	206550595	219000000	84.47%	79.67%
	appliancess	63066614	0	63066614	85792141	73.51%							
	spare parts	51932303	0	51932303	55376459	93.78%							
sixth	durgs	92097172	211024	92308196	112326978	82.18%	191632141	567923	192200064	205276935	330000000	93.63%	58.24%
	appliancess	51406028	262849	51668877	60616714	85.24%							
	spare parts	48128941	94050	48222991	68333902	70.57%							
seventh	durgs	96129508	2076398	98205906	150597333	65.21%	172728858	4880384	177609242	295512357	433000000	60.10%	41.02%
	appliancess	57212935	1540099	58753034	107501606	54.65%							
	spare parts	19386415	1263887	20650302	72096769	28.64%							

farah

Stutas For Arrived Items for The Eighth Phases until 19/6/2001

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Phase	Artic[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
eighth	durgs	5744069	1034858	6778927	150277704	4.51%	5792955	1034858	6827813	116446909	624750000	5.86%	1.09%
	appliancess	48886	0	48886	85923571	0.06%							
	spare parts	0	0	0	64779857	0.00%							
summation		1212139235	35526164	1218772584	1837301202	66.33%	1212139235	6633349	1218772584	1569506319	2395750000	77.65%	50.87%

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TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS DUE TO EMBARGO SELECTED CAUSES *

THE PERIODS	AGE GROUPS		TOTAL
	UNDER(5)	OVER (5)	
1989	7110	20224	27334

THE PERIODS		AGE GROUPS		TOTAL
		UNDER(5)	OVER (5)	
1990		8903	23561	32464
1991		27473	58469	85942
1992		46933	76530	123463
1993		49762	78261	128023
1994		52905	80776	133681
1995		55823	82961	138784
1996		56997	83284	140281
1997		58845	85942	144787
1998		71279	88760	160039
1999		80044	97439	177483
2000		81804	98124	179928
2001	January-May	32119	43423	75542
GRAND TOTAL		622887	897530	1520417

* SELECTED CAUSES ARE :

UNDER (5) MORTALITY
1- RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS
2- DIARRHOEA & GASTROENTERITIS
3- MALNUTRITION

OVER(5) MORTALITY
1- CARDIAC DISEASES
2- HYPERTENSION
3- DIABETES MELLITUS
4- RENAL DISEASES
5- LIVER DISEASES
6- MALIGNANT NEOPLASMS

INFANT MORTALITY RATE = 107.9 PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS
UNDER 5 MORTALITY RATE = 130.6 PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS
MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE = 294.0 PER 100000 LIVE BIRTHS
} MATERNAL AND UNDER 5 CHILDREN MORTALITY SURVEY . 1999

Prepared by V. & H. Statistical Dept

UNDER (5) MORTALITY DUE TO EMBARGO SELECTED CAUSES		
PERIOD OF EMBARGO		MONTHLY AVERAGE
1989		593
1990		742
1991		2289
1992		3911
1993		4147
1994		4409
1995		4651
1996		4750
1997		4904
1998		5940
1999		6670
2000		6817
2001	January	7813
	February	6811
	March	5837
	April	5245
	May	6413

OVER (5) MORTALITY DUE TO EMBARGO SELECTED CAUSES		
PERIOD OF EMBARGO		MONTHLY AVERAGE
1989		1685
1990		1963
1991		4872
1992		6377
1993		6522
1994		6731
1995		6913
1996		6940
1997		7162
1998		7397
1999		8119
2000		8177
2001	January	8212
	February	7953
	March	9552
	April	9231
	May	8475

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EFFECT OF EMBARGO ON MAJOR SURGICAL OPERATIONS

PERIOD OF EMBARGO		MONTHLY AVERAGE	DEC. RATE FROM 1989 %
1989		15125	-
1990		8668	- 43
1991		6507	- 57
1992		5477	- 63.7
1993		5205	- 65.6
1994		4679	- 69.1
1995		4492	- 70.3
1996		4417	- 70.8
1997		4357	-71.19
1998		4322	- 71.4
1999		4442	- 70.6
2000		5005	- 66.9
2001	January	5181	- 65.7
	Fepruary	5427	- 64.1
	March	5504	- 63.6
	April	6106	- 59.6
	May	6270	- 58.5

EFFECT OF EMBARGO ON LABORATORY INVESTIGATIONS

PERIOD OF EMBARGO		MONTHLY AVERAGE	DEC. RATE FROM 1989 %
1989		1494050	-
1990		1091230	- 27
1991		635446	- 57
1992		589952	- 60.5
1993		576225	- 61.4
1994		531384	- 64.4
1995		501095	- 66.4
1996		500036	- 66.5
1997		499579	- 66.56
1998		498989	- 66.6
1999		515506	- 65.4
2000		561763	- 62.4
2001	January	562027	- 62.4
	February	590020	- 60.5
	March	555437	- 62.8
	April	569800	- 61.9
	May	579743	- 61.2

Prepared by V. & H. Statistical Dept

PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED BIRTHS UNDER (2.5) KGS. BODY WT. TO THE TOTAL REGISTERED BIRTHS DURING THE PERIOD OF EMBARGO

PERIOD OF EMBARGO		*MONTHLY AVERAGE %*
1990		*4.5*
1991		*10.8*
1992		*17.6*
1993		*19.7*
1994		*21.1*
1995		*22.05*
1996		*22.60*
1997		*23.02*
1998		*23.81*
1999		*24.04*
2000		*24.32*
2001	*January*	*25.17*
	February	*26.28*
	March	*23.75*
	April	*22.63*
	May	*24.76*

Prepared by V. & H. Statistical Dept.

FFECT OF EMBARGO ON THE NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF THE UNDER (5) YEARS OLD CHILDREN

YEAR		Kwashiorkor			Marasmus			Other Protein -Calorie & Vitamins, Malnutrition			Total		
		No. Of Cases	Monthly Average	Increase Rate From 1990	No. Of Cases	Monthly Average	Increase Rate From 1990	No. Of Cases	Monthly Average	Increase Rate From 1990	No. Of Cases	Monthly Average	Increase Rate From 1990
1990		485	41	-	5193	433	-	96809	8063	-	102487	8541	-
1991		12796	1066	26.3	96186	8015	18.5	947974	78998	9.8	1056956	88079	10.3
1992		13744	1145	27.9	111477	9289	21.4	1123319	93610	11.6	1248540	104045	12.1
1993		15128	1261	30.8	139346	11612	26.8	1235657	102971	12.8	1390131	115844	13.6
1994		20975	1748	42.6	192296	16025	37	1576194	131349	16.3	1789465	149122	17.5
1995		26984	2249	54.8	244023	20335	47	1753355	146113	18.1	2024362	168697	19.7
1996		28111	2342	57.12	247302	20609	47.59	1802112	150176	18.62	2077525	173127	20.27
1997		28475	2373	57.88	253483	21123	48.78	1850771	154231	19.13	2132729	177727	20.81
1998		30232	2519	61.4	264468	22039	50.8	1910309	159192	19.74	2205030	183752	21.5
1999		31091	2591	63.19	279821	23318	53.58	1925871	160489	19.90	2236783	186398	21.82
2000		31428	2620	63.87	282928	23577	54.45	1948567	162381	20.13	2262923	188577	22.08
2001	January	3508	-	85.6	30567	-	70.6	154061	-	19.1	188042	-	22.0
	February	2491	-	60.8	23529	-	54.3	122883	-	15.2	148837	-	17.4
	March	1731	-	42.2	24303	-	56.1	150443	-	18.7	176439	-	20.7
	April	2522	-	61.5	20473	-	47.3	167187	-	20.7	190237	-	22.3
	May	2717	-	66.3	19749	-	45.6	157269	-	19.5	179785	-	21.0

Prepared by V. & H. Statistical Dept.

EFFECT OF EMBARGO ON THE COMMUNICABLE DISEASE IN IRAQ

THE DISEASE	1989	1991		1993		1995		1997		1998		1999		2000	
	NO. OF CASES	NO. OF CASES	INCREASE RATE FROM 1989	NO. OF CASES	INCREASE RATE FROM 1989	NO. OF CASES	INCREASE RATE FROM 1989	NO OF CASES	INCREASE RATE FROM 1989	NO. OF CASES	INCREASE RATE FROM 1989	NO OF CASES	INCREASE RATE FROM 1989	NO OF CASES	INCREJAN RATE FROM 1989
POLIOMYELITIS	10	186	18.6	75	7.5	32	3.2	31	3.1	29	2.9	75	7.5	4	0.4
DIPHTHERIA	96	511	5.4	239	2.49	119	1.24	290	3.02	160	1.6	142	1.5	34	0.35
WHOOPING COUPH	368	1537	4.1	767	2.08	475	1.29	535	1.45	1271	3.4	466	1.3	407	1.1
MEASLES	5715	11358	1.9	16399	2.87	7134	1.25	556	0.09	25818	4.5	9920	1.7	726	0.13
GERMAN MEASLES	514	2848	5.5	928	1.8	338	0.66	17	0.03	65	0.12	4127	8	1612	3.1
TETANUS NEON.	42	936	22.2	171	4.1	64	1.52	73	1.74	36	0.86	49	1.2	37	0.9
TETANUS	32	933	29.1	64	2	31	0.97	25	0.78	26	0.81	19	0.6	17	0.5
MUMPS	9639	22718	2.3	46961	4.87	29195	3.03	49556	5.14	35881	3.7	25554	2.65	18720	1.9
CHOLERA	0	1217	1217	825	825	1216	1216	486	486	2560	2560	2398	2398	757	757
TYPHOID FEVER	1812	17524	9.6	22688	12.5	26634	14.70	14464	7.98	19825	10.9	23392	13	24614	13.6
GIARDIASIS	73416	501391	6.8	602011	8.2	689113	9.38	605170	8.24	509050	6.9	535140	7.3	542365	7.4
AMOEBIC DYSEN.	19615	58311	2.9	62864	3.2	668064	34.06	329950	16.82	264290	13.4	609920	31	643251	32.8
VIRAL HEPATITIS	1816	11135	6.1	16801	9.2	15557	8.57	18501	3.62	12142	6.7	13150	7.24	8879	4.9
MENINGITIS	2559	5792	2.3	3772	1.47	2853	1.11	1202	0.47	1025	0.40	656	0.25	574	0.2
MALARIA	3428	7105	2	4581	1.34	59931	17.48	9594	2.79	6996	2.04	3212	0.9	1154	0.3
BAGHDAD BOIL	1829	8233	4.5	7378	4.03	7703	4.21	2939	1.61	2985	1.6	1261	0.7	955	0.5
KALAZAR	491	3713	7.5	3817	7.77	3110	6.33	794	1.62	874	1.8	744	1.5	2611	5.3
HAEMORHAGIC F.	38	196	5.1	48	1.53	48	1.26	11	0.29	2	0.05	2	0.05	4	0.1
BRUCELLOSIS	2464	13106	5.3	14989	6.1	19040	7.73	8911	3.62	5305	2.15	7083	2.9	8551	3.5
TOXOPLOSMOSIS	372	2223	5.9	3145	8.45	4640	12.47	2960	7.96	2036	5.47	3506	9.4	3834	10.3
HYDATIDOSIS	370	1787	4.8	2108	5.69	2908	7.86	257	0.69	345	0.93	440	1.2	521	1.4
SCABIES	0	1892	1892	10354	10354	18209	18209	40360	40360	43580	43580	35343	35343	23217	23217
RABIES	25	256	10.2	49	1.96	34	1.36	6	0.24	14	0.56	27	1.08	14	0.6

Prepared by V. & H. Statistical Dept.

Effects of the Comprehensive Embargo on deaths for age group of over (5) year-old for selective causes



Effects of the Comprehensive Embargo on deaths for age group of under (5) years old for selective causes



Effects of the Comprehensive Embargo on major surgery



Effects of the Comprehensive Embargo on laboratory tests



United Nations S/2001/660

Security Council

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Third report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)

I. Introduction

1. The statement by the President of the Security Council dated 23 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/2) requested me to keep the Council regularly informed of the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and of the situation in the Central African Republic, including the progress achieved in implementing political, economic and social reforms.

2. The Security Council also requested me to submit to it a report on the situation by 30 June 2001, at the latest, pursuant to the statement by its President dated 10 February 2000. The present report is in response to that request. It is the third report to have been prepared since the establishment of BONUCA, on 16 February 2000, and covers the period from February to June 2001.

II. The political situation

3. The political situation in the Central African Republic was recently exacerbated by a wholly unexpected attempted coup d'état. During the night of 27 to 28 May 2001, a group of soldiers attempted to overthrow the regime of President Patassé and to seize power. The putschists simultaneously attacked the residence of the head of State, the national radio and the headquarters of the Presidential Guard. They were repulsed by loyalist forces and the coup attempt failed thanks to the support of Libyan troops sent to Bangui and to the support of elements of the Congolese rebel movement of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba. I immediately on 28 May expressed my vigorous condemnation of this attempted coup against an elected Government, as did the Security Council in the statement by its President dated 31 May 2001.

4. On 30 May 2001, General André Kolingba, a former President of the Republic, claimed responsibility for the attempted coup. In a statement, he demanded that President Patassé "resign and hand over power to him" and pledged to "guarantee his personal security and the safety of his property". On 31 May, President Patassé issued a decree demoting General Kolingba and four other officers involved in the coup to the rank of privates and decided to institute charges against them and all the others involved in the attempted coup.

5. On 1 June 2001, former President Kolingba called on the putschists to cease fighting and to lay down their weapons. He also requested a meeting with the Minister of Defence "on neutral ground". President Patassé rejected this offer of negotiations. The clashes therefore continued between loyalists and putschists and ended on 6 June 2001.

6. On 8 June 2001, President Patassé solemnly announced the failure of the *coup d'état* and called on workers to return to work. He thanked those States and organizations that had condemned the attempted coup and mentioned in particular the prompt reaction of the United Nations and especially of the Security Council. He reaffirmed that the trial of the putschists would be held under transparent conditions and that international observers would be allowed to monitor it. President

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Patassé lastly requested international attestation of the fact that weapons had been found in the residence of former President Kolingba and asked that a Security Council delegation be sent to Bangui for that purpose.

7. The situation is gradually returning to normal in Bangui. The Government is working to restore security in the capital. The casualty figures from the clashes are very high: according to the authorities, 59 persons were killed (25 military and 34 civilians) and 88,765 displaced. Destruction of property (public buildings, private homes) and looting also took place. Agencies of the United Nations system, donors and international non-governmental organizations are mobilizing to provide appropriate humanitarian assistance, which the authorities estimate will cost US$ 3.6 million.

8. In view of the new crisis that arose following the attempted coup d'état of 28 May, I dispatched General Amadou Toumani Touré, former President of Mali, as my Special Envoy to the Central African Republic from 12 June to 1 July. My Special Envoy is very familiar with the situation on the ground, since he was a key member of the International Monitoring Committee and of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), following the mutinies of 1996 and 1997. His mandate was to, inter alia, hold discussions on the current political situation with the authorities, leaders of political parties and civil society stakeholders; assess the humanitarian consequences of the fighting and consider how best the needs that were identified might be met; and encourage a resumption of the political dialogue in the country. In the report that he submitted to me, my Special Envoy made a number of recommendations to assist the Central African Republic in overcoming this situation of crisis. Several of these recommendations are contained in the present report.

9. It should be pointed out that the use of force came as a genuine surprise for the people of the Central African Republic. While it is true that social tensions remained high following another breakdown in the dialogue between the Government and the trade unions and that the dialogue between the majority party and the opposition remained at an impasse, that in no way justified a challenge to the constitutional order. Indeed, the cabinet reshuffle that had been expected for months had finally taken place. A new Prime Minister, Mr. Martin Ziguélé, a member of the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC), the party in power, had been appointed on 1 April of this year. The head of government had presented his programme to the Parliament on 7 May and, in the absence of the opposition, had received a vote of confidence, even though the opposition contests the validity of that vote under the Constitution of the Central African Republic.

10. This programme had been welcomed, even by the Government's political opponents, during the debates in Parliament, especially because of its provisions relating to the fight against corruption and misappropriation of funds. The idea of an attempted coup d'état, especially one instigated by the leader of the main opposition party in Parliament, was therefore completely unexpected. This was also the reason why all political figures (including opposition parties) and civil society stakeholders roundly condemned it.

III. The social situation

11. Despite the return to normalcy in the capital since the end of the fighting, the resumption of work has not been complete in a public sector affected by a strike of civil servants before the attempted *coup d'état*. The social movement had begun with a warning strike from 14 to 18 May 2001. The strike had been renewed from 21 to 25 May. Workers demanded payment of salaries for April and May before any resumption of work. After the strike by civil servants from October 2000 to January 2001, the Government had agreed to pay three months of arrears in wages in January 2001. Following mediation by the Archbishop of Bangui and by my representative, which had been requested by the trade unions, the two parties signed on 6 March 2001 a communiqué in which the Government pledged to pay the salaries of civil servants every month. In exchange, the workers agreed to return to work and to observe a social truce for a period of two months, renewable once.

12. When the social truce ended on 5 May 2001, the trade unions refused to renew it on the grounds that the Government had failed to honour its commitments, since salaries for the month of March had not been paid until April. For its part, the Government considered that recourse to the strike was "premature and unjustified", since "two salaries out of three (February and March) had been fully paid" since the beginning of the social truce on 6 March 2001.

13. It should be noted that the authorities had announced the payment after 26 May of salaries for the month of April. This payment was interrupted by the attempted *coup d'état*. The civil servants' strike therefore continues, since it has not been officially called off. This situation of social tension risks continuing because of the adverse consequences of the failed coup attempt on the capacity of the Central African Republic in the current situation to mobilize the resources necessary to meet its basic expenses.

IV. The human rights situation

14. The situation of human rights has been markedly affected by the events that followed the attempted *coup d'état*. Civilian populations were particularly affected, in that thousands of persons were displaced from one district to the other of Bangui, in the suburbs of the capital. Cases of exactions and of the summary executions of civilian and military personnel were reported. The Government pledged to put an end to those acts. To do so, it has introduced special military patrols to restore security in the capital. The human rights section of BONUCA is currently evaluating the situation, in cooperation with relevant non-governmental organizations and the competent authorities.

15. In general terms, since my last report, the prison situation continues to give cause for concern. Visits to detention centres in the country's interior, police stations and gendarmerie brigades in Bangui show that detention centres need to be urgently rehabilitated. Moreover, cases of serious or contagious illnesses have been reported in the different centres, together with cases of the ill and/or degrading treatment of detainees.

16. The number of persons imprisoned without trial for many years and arbitrary and illegal detentions have contributed to an increase in the prison population in certain provinces. My Representative has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Central African authorities to the measures that must be taken to improve the situation of detainees in prisons, in accordance with the international juridical instruments ratified by the Central African Republic. The Government, moreover, has just listed as one of its priority programmes the rehabilitation of the Ngaragba central prison in Bangui, which had been destroyed in the mutinies of 1996.

17. During the period under review, there have been a number of attempts to restrict freedom of movement, which is protected by article 4 of the Constitution of the Central African Republic. Political and trade union leaders have been prohibited from leaving the country. Prompt intervention by my Representative with the authorities brought an end to this situation.

18. As part of its activities to strengthen the capacities of national institutions for the promotion of human rights, BONUCA organized in Bangui from 6 to 8 February 2001, in partnership with the Central African Republic Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, an instructors training workshop for senior officials of ministerial departments. It also organized in Bambari from 3 to 19 May 2001, in partnership with the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, an initial training session for officials in the implementation of laws in the provinces. The programme of judicial assistance for victims of human rights violations in courts and tribunals was launched on 1 March 2001, in partnership with the bar of the Central African Republic. The Office is continuing its programmes for the dissemination and popularization of human rights through the media. It has also embarked on the translation into the national language, Sango, of the principal international legal texts and instruments ratified by the Central African Republic in the area of the promotion and protection of human rights.

V. The security and military situation

19. The attempted *coup d'état* of 28 May 2001 had serious repercussions on the military and security situation. The vast majority of the army remained loyal and, according to the authorities, the number of participants in the attempted coup never exceeded 100 or so. It therefore seems unlikely that the failed coup attempt has jeopardized the restructuring of the defence and security forces upon which the Government had embarked, especially since the Higher Council on Conditions in the Military, which was entrusted with the task of reviewing the living and working conditions of soldiers, was established on 23 May last.

20. More generally speaking, the period from February to June 2001 was marked by heightened insecurity in certain provinces. "Roadblockers" or "Zaraguinas" committed a number of criminal and often deadly acts: attacks on travellers, military

convoys and cattle farmers, and pillaging of refugee camps and villages. In Bangui itself, a number of acts of armed banditry (hold-ups, thefts) were reported, thus highlighting the situation of proliferation of illegally owned weapons.

21. Generally speaking, since the attempted *coup d'état*, security has been restored in Bangui. However, the population remains concerned because of exactions and settling of scores, which are apparently targeted, but also because of rumours of imminent attack by the putschists. The Government has firmly rejected any idea of persecution of an ethnic group. It has taken measures to restore security throughout the capital. The fear exists, however, that infiltration within the civilian population of elements that participated in the putsch might in the longer term prove to be the source of a new wave of insecurity, just as a possible attack by the main coup plotters who have since fled might be.

22. In terms of activities, the military and civilian police teams of BONUCA undertook a fact-finding mission on the border between the Central African Republic and Cameroon last March, following the tensions that had arisen between the two countries in February 2001. This initiative by my Representative resulted in an easing of tensions that permitted the two countries to envisage the demarcation of their common border within the framework of their mixed commission on cooperation. As part of its activities to provide support for the police and gendarmerie of the Central African Republic, the civilian police team organized during the period from March to May 2001 a number of training programmes: a specialized course in transmissions, a specialized course in economic and financial policing, refresher training for police officers, and a professional training course for the gendarmerie.

VI. The economic situation

23. The attempted *coup d'état* further damaged the Central African economy. The interruption of economic activity for two weeks will without a doubt have catastrophic consequences for an already fragile economy. As the Prime Minister said, the failed coup attempt has "wiped out" all the economic recovery efforts which the country has made with the support of its development partners.

24. The most recent joint mission of the Bretton Woods institutions, in which a delegation from the African Development Bank also participated, visited Bangui from 13 to 27 May 2001. The mission concluded that the Government should pursue and intensify its efforts in the area of economic and financial reforms. Observance of performance criteria was to have been evaluated at the end of June, with an additional review being conducted during the last quarter of the year. The case of the Central African Republic was to have been submitted to the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund in September and a decision on its eligibility for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) was to have been taken in December 2001.

25. Recent events will have a negative impact on these timelines. Agreement must therefore be reached with the Government of the Central African Republic that the emergency situation that currently exists in the country requires emergency assistance from donors and the international community to meet priority needs, before considering any solution to overcome the crisis. To this end, the authorities have just elaborated and presented to the diplomatic corps and agencies of the United Nations system in Bangui a "minimum plan of action for social and economic recovery", estimated to cost approximately US$ 75 million. In order to really assist the Central African Republic, donors and the international community in general should respond promptly and positively to this request for assistance, which is crucial to the country's future.

VII. Relations between the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

26. The consequences for the Central African Republic of the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had thus far been felt in the economic (interruption of river traffic on the Ubangui, supply difficulties), humanitarian (refugee flows) and security (risk of illegal circulation of weapons) fields. With the attempted *coup d'état* and the support provided by the Front de libération des Congolais of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba to President Patassé, the impact of the conflict risked also having a political dimension in terms of bilateral relations. While reiterating his desire to see peace restored in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Patassé had expressed special gratitude to

Mr. Bemba for helping him rout the putschists. This support by the rebel movement for the Government of the Central African Republic had not been appreciated by the Congolese authorities, who had expressed surprise, in view of the defence agreement between the two States.

27. The recent visit of a Congolese delegation to Bangui helped clear up the misunderstandings between the two Governments. The Congo River Basin Authority now being planned will certainly provide a suitable framework for building confidence and cooperation between the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

VIII. Observations

28. The attempted *coup d'état* revealed the precariousness of the overall situation and further weakened the Central African Republic. It jeopardized the efforts which the international community has been making for five years with a view to the restoration and then the consolidation of peace. It endangered the democratic process and impeded the country's efforts for economic recovery. The Central African Republic is therefore in a crisis situation which is not fundamentally different from the situation caused by the 1996-1997 mutinies. It is experiencing an economic emergency which requires prompt assistance from the international community. Bilateral and multilateral partners should show exceptional solicitude in this case. I encourage them to review the minimum plan of action referred to in paragraph 25 and to see to what extent they could assist in its implementation.

29. I encourage the international community and the development partners of the Central African Republic, out of concern for peace and stability in this country, to provide urgent support to the restructuring of the defence and security forces, the collection of weapons and the redeployment plan drawn up by the Government. The continuation and completion of the restructuring of the armed forces is a priority task. The efforts already made in this sphere and the training provided by BONUCA enabled the army of the Central African Republic to demonstrate its loyalty during the attempted *coup d'état*.

30. There is no question that it is poverty which, in the final analysis, is the breeding ground for the instability experienced by the Central African Republic, but it is partly because of the financial difficulties of the State and the subsequent salary crisis that the political and economic situation has become so fragile. Efforts should be made to provide substantial assistance in this sphere so as to prevent this situation from deteriorating and the Central African Republic from continuing to be the "soft underbelly" of the subregion.

31. While the international community has a duty of solidarity towards the Central African Republic, the Central Africans, in return, have an urgent duty to work together to establish the conditions for a political system based on consensus. To this end, they should urgently re-establish political dialogue, restore confidence among themselves, foster consultations and promote tolerance. I welcome the recent initiatives taken by the Parliament, which adopted a resolution on 21 June unanimously condemning the attempted coup, and by President Patassé, who met with the leaders of the political parties on 25 June. I also urge the Government to continue to ensure respect for the human rights of all Central Africans. BONUCA will continue its efforts to facilitate the attainment of these objectives.

32. I therefore encourage the Central African political actors to continue and strengthen these initiatives with a view to consolidating peace, democratic institutions and national unity in the Central African Republic. The majority must allow the opposition to carry out its activities freely and the opposition, while performing in a constructive and responsible manner its role of critic and monitor of the actions of the Government pending the next elections, must let the majority govern. It is on these conditions alone that the Central African Republic will be able to emerge from this interminable crisis situation which seems to be its defining characteristic. At the subregional level, I encourage the Central African Republic to intensify its relations with its neighbours in order to reduce the tension which may compromise the precarious stability of the subregion.

33. At the time of submitting this report, I should like to pay a warm tribute to my former representative, Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Sy, for the remarkable work he carried out with integrity and dedication at the head of BONUCA.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1335 (2001) of 12 January 2001 by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) until 15 July 2001. It covers developments since my last report on UNMOP of 11 April 2001 (S/2001/350).

2. UNMOP consists of 27 United Nations military observers (see annex) headed by a Chief Military Observer, Colonel Graeme Williams (New Zealand).

3. In accordance with its mandate, UNMOP continues to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and the neighbouring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by conducting daily vehicle and foot patrols throughout its area of responsibility. The Mission holds periodic meetings with the local authorities in order to strengthen liaison, reduce tension, improve safety and security and promote confidence between the parties. The Chief Military Observer maintains contact with the authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade in order to address issues arising from the implementation of resolution 1335 (2001). Cooperation between UNMOP and the multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) is maintained through periodic meetings.

II. Situation in the area of responsibility of the Mission

4. The area of responsibility of UNMOP and the designation of the demilitarized and United Nations-controlled zones remain as previously reported. The situation there has remained stable and calm. UNMOP continues to maintain its 24-hour presence at the team site on the Ostra peninsula, at Herceg Novi in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and at the headquarters at Cavtat and the team site at Gruda in Croatia.

Demilitarized zone

5. In accordance with the security regime agreed by the two parties, their police forces maintain control of the demilitarized zone. These are, on the Yugoslav side, the Montenegrin Border Police and Special Police and, on the Croatian side, until June 2001, the Croatian Special Police. In June 2001, the Croatian authorities informed UNMOP that the Special Police was being disbanded and its personnel assigned to other policing duties. As a consequence, the demilitarized zone on the Croatian side is now patrolled by a newly formed "Police Intervention Unit" and regular uniformed police.

6. The disbandment of the Croatian Special Police was followed by a significant reduction in the number of Croatian police stationed in the demilitarized zone. There has been no appreciable change in the number or disposition of Montenegrin Border Police and Special Police personnel stationed in the demilitarized zone on the Yugoslav side. Under the security regime, there is no limit to the number of police permitted in the demilitarized zone.

7. With minor exceptions, the demilitarized zone was respected by both parties during the reporting period. On 16 April 2001, a military helicopter operated by the international security presence in

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Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (KFOR), overflew the zone. KFOR was informed of the demilitarized status of the zone and was requested to respect it in future.

8. As reported previously, the United Nations military observers enjoy unrestricted freedom of movement on the Yugoslav side of the demilitarized zone. On the Croatian side, despite the withdrawal of the Special Police and the reduction in the number of police in the zone, the authorities have not withdrawn their requirement that UNMOP provide advance written notice before undertaking foot or vehicle patrols in the northern part of the zone.

9. On 19 and 22 June, Croatian officials at the Brgat/Ivanica crossing point between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, outside of the demilitarized zone, prevented United Nations vehicles carrying administrative supplies from the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) to UNMOP from transiting through Croatia.

United Nations-controlled zone

10. The deployment of police forces in the United Nations-controlled zone in violation of the security regime continues, although the number of Croatian police stationed in the zone has been reduced. Currently, approximately 10 Croatian police are located at two positions and approximately 10 Montenegrin Border Police are stationed at two positions inside the zone. The Croatian police conduct foot and vehicle patrols throughout the part of the zone accessible to them.

11. Croatia and Montenegro continue to maintain checkpoints in the United Nations-controlled zone for the purpose of operating the crossing regime that they initiated at Cape Kobila in January 1999. The presence of these manned checkpoints, which allow limited movement by local civilians between Montenegro and Croatia, is a violation of the agreed security regime.

12. The Croatian authorities continue to permit civilians, including local and foreign tourists, to enter the United Nations-controlled zone for fishing, recreation and the collection of firewood. The Montenegrin authorities permit similar activities in the part of the zone controlled by them, though in fewer numbers than on the Croatian side. The waters of the United Nations-controlled zone continue to be violated daily by small craft which enter from both the Croatia and Montenegrin sides in approximately equ numbers.

13. On 16 April 2001, approximately 100 sightsee were brought into the United Nations-controlled zo in buses from the Croatian side under escort b Croatian police. On 25 April 2001, a vehicle bearin Croatian military licence plates and carrying tw occupants was observed in the zone. The Croatia authorities later expressed regret for this incursio which they described as accidental. On 29 April 200 about 120 persons in approximately 60 vehicles enter the zone from the Croatian side in peaceful prote against a decision by the Croatian Government on la ownership. They were monitored by Croatian police.

14. The activities described above, which involv the unauthorized presence of civilians and officials the United Nations-controlled zone, as well restriction on the movement of United Nations milita observers, are violations of the agreed security regi which UNMOP has protested to the two parties. Whi they do not constitute a security threat, th demonstrate disregard for a regime that was agre upon freely by the parties and which UNMOP obliged to monitor.

III. Progress towards a negotiated settlement

15. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croat have indicated repeatedly their willingness to resol their dispute over Prevlaka through bilater negotiations pursuant to the Agreement Normalization of Relations signed by them at Belgra on 23 August 1996 (see S/1996/706, annex). reported previously, each Government has submitted proposal for settling the dispute (see S/1998/533 a S/1998/632) and their negotiating teams have held fo rounds of formal talks, the last at Belgrade on 9 Mar 1999. In a document signed at Verbania, Italy, 8 June 2001, the Presidents of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia and Croatia reiterated their willingness strengthen the process of normalization of relatio with emphasis on the free movement of people, goo and ideas between the two States. The document ma no specific mention of the Prevlaka issue.

16. Since that time, contacts on bilateral issu including Prevlaka, have continued between the t

countries. In addition to working-level meetings, Yugoslav and Croatian officials held meetings in Belgrade on 11 June and in Vienna on 28 June 2001, during which the issue of Prevlaka was broached. The United Nations did not participate in or observe those meetings but was informed of them in New York. The official positions of the parties were conveyed most recently to the President of the Security Council in letters dated 22 December 2000 (S/2000/1235, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and 5 January 2001 (S/2001/13, from Croatia).

IV. Confidence-building measures

17. As will be recalled, pursuant to the Security Council's request in resolution 1252 (1999), a package of recommendations and options for confidence-building was conveyed informally to the parties by the Secretariat in October 1999 (see S/1999/1051, para. 20). The package covered basic elements of the dispute, confidence-building measures and freedom of movement for local civilians. Subsequent consultations with the parties showed that they favoured some of the options but rejected others, reflecting their overall divergent views on the dispute. During the reporting period, there were no new developments in this regard.

V. Financial aspects

18. Although an independent mission, UNMOP draws its administrative and budgetary support from UNMIBH. By its resolution 55/268 of 14 June 2001, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $140 million gross for the maintenance of UNMIBH for the 12-month period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002.

19. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMOP beyond 15 July 2001, as recommended in paragraph 23 below, the costs of maintaining the Mission would be met from within the budget of UNMIBH.

VI. Observations

20. It is encouraging that Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have resumed discussions on the Prevlaka dispute. In my report of 11 April 2001 (S/2001/350), I stated that I intended to explore, together with the parties, ways of advancing the political process on Prevlaka. United Nations officials in New York have since discussed the issue with the Permanent Representatives of the parties and, at my request, United Nations officials in the region have taken it up informally with their counterparts in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the basis of their reports, I have concluded that the parties prefer to continue their efforts to solve the dispute bilaterally.

21. While the United Nations has been assured by the parties at several levels that they remain committed to reaching a negotiated solution on Prevlaka, it is my assessment that further time will be required for progress to be made. This could occur through implementation of the options package, or elements of it, or along lines that the parties might decide to pursue on a bilateral basis. Although third party assistance has so far not been sought, I would reiterate my offer of the good offices of the United Nations, should the parties require this assistance in the search for a solution. UNMOP stands ready to assist in the development of practical arrangements to give effect to any agreement that the parties might reach.

22. As observed many times previously, the continuing long-standing violations of the security regime on Prevlaka are not conducive to the development of confidence. In the United Nations-controlled zone, the presence of Croatian police, albeit in reduced numbers, and Montenegrin Border Police is a long-standing violation. Additionally, the continued operation of the illegal checkpoints at Cape Kobila interferes with the free movement of the United Nations military observers. Accordingly, the Montenegrin and Croatian police units should be withdrawn from the United Nations-controlled zone and the Cape Kobila checkpoints removed to the boundaries of the zone, or their continued operation legitimized by agreement between the parties. In addition, the Croatian authorities should rescind the restriction on the movement of the United Nations military observers in the demilitarized zone.

23. The reduction by the Croatian authorities of the number of police stationed in the demilitarized zone reflects confidence on their part that the area is likely to remain calm and stable. This accords with the assessment of UNMOP. Given the importance of ensuring that conditions on the ground remain calm and free of tension, and in order to maintain the stability that is essential to meaningful progress towards a political settlement, I recommend that the mandate of

UNMOP be extended for a further six months, until 15 January 2002. The Security Council may wish to request the parties to continue to report regularly on progress in their talks.

24. In conclusion, I wish to point out that UNMOP and its predecessors have, by their continued presence and patrolling over a period of more than eight years, contributed significantly towards ensuring the stability of the Prevlaka area and the southern border between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I should like to commend the Chief Military Observer and the men and women of UNMOP for their unstinting efforts to maintain peace and security in their area of responsibility.

Annex

Composition and strength of the military element of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka as at 1 July 2001

Nationality	*Number of military observers*
Argentina	1
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Egypt	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Indonesia	2
Ireland	1
Jordan	1
Kenya	1
Nepal	1
New Zealand	2[a]
Nigeria	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Russian Federation	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Ukraine	1
Total	**27**

[a] Including Chief Military Observer.

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